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WEIS, Circuit Judge.  
 In this criminal case, defendant contends that the 
trial court erred when it denied her request for an individual 
jury poll and instead conducted a collective inquiry.  In the 
circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not commit 
reversible error, but we adopt a prospective supervisory rule 
requiring that jurors shall be polled individually rather than 
collectively.  We also affirm the trial court's rulings rejecting 
a duress defense and permitting the government to call a witness 
whom it had impeached in a previous trial.   
 Defendant Carol A. Miller was convicted on charges of 
bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and interstate transportation of a 
stolen vehicle, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2312.  She was sentenced to a 
prison term of twenty-seven months concurrent on both counts, 
followed by supervised release for three years, and ordered to 
pay restitution in the amount of $44,500.00. 
 In February 1991, defendant and her husband, George P. 
Salemo, engaged in a check-kiting scheme through which they 
defrauded the Meridian Bank in Allentown, Pennsylvania.  Using 
proceeds from that operation, they purchased an automobile for 
$98,024.00.   
 On March 27, 1991, the husband was arrested in Florida.  
On that same day, defendant, who was also in Florida at the time, 
telephoned her home in Allentown, Pennsylvania and directed the 
housekeeper to take the automobile from the garage and park it on 
  
a designated side street.  On the following day, defendant 
returned to Allentown. 
 On March 29, 1991, at the behest of the Meridian Bank, 
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County served an order 
on defendant enjoining her and her husband from disposing of any 
of their assets.  On the next day, the defendant's brother 
arrived in Allentown.  He located the automobile and drove it to 
Arizona.  On April 8, 1991, defendant flew to Arizona and, on the 
following day, sold the car for $89,000.00 in Las Vegas, Nevada.  
 Before trial, the district court granted the 
prosecution's motion in limine to bar defendant from presenting 
evidence of duress.  After the jury returned guilty verdicts on 
each count charged in the indictment, defendant requested an 
individual poll of the jurors.  The district judge refused to do 
so but inquired of the jurors collectively. 
 Defendant has appealed, raising four issues: 
 (1) The district court's denial of an individual poll 
  of the jurors; 
 
 (2) Exclusion of the defendant's duress evidence;  
 
 (3) The government's use of a witness in this case  
 that it had impeached in a former trial; and 
 
 (4)  Failure of the district court to depart downward  
 from the Guideline sentence. 
 
 I. 
  Following the charge of the court, the jury deliberated 
for about an hour and then returned to the courtroom to deliver 
its verdict.  The record shows that the following occurred: 
  "THE COURT:  Members of the Jury, I 
understand you have reached a verdict and the 
  
way the verdict is to be taken will be as 
follows:  First the Clerk of Court will ask 
the foreperson as to the results of the 
verdict form.  Then, of course, you should 
listen intently while it's going on and then 
the other 11 persons will be asked whether 
they agree as a group.  You will be asked 
whether you agree with the verdict as 
announced by the foreperson. 
 
  "If you do, of course, you will say 
`yes.'  If you do not agree with the verdict, 
of course, you should say `no.'  So listen 
carefully.  If you agree when you are asked 
collectively, you say `yes.'  If you do not 
agree, please let us know.  Thank you. 
 
  "Would the Clerk take the verdict. 
 
  "THE CLERK:  Would the foreperson please 
rise?   
  "Have the Members of the Jury reached a 
verdict by answering the jury verdict form? 
 
  "THE FOREPERSON:  Yes. 
 
  "THE CLERK:  How do you find the 
defendant as to Count 1, bank fraud? 
 
  "THE FOREPERSON:  Guilty. 
 
  "THE CLERK:  As to Count 2, interstate 
transportation of [a] stolen vehicle? 
 
  "THE FOREPERSON:  Guilty. 
 
  "THE CLERK:  Thank you. 
 
  "THE COURT:  You may be seated. 
 
  "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I ask 
the jury be polled. 
 
  "THE COURT:  I am going to do it 
collectively.  I won't do it individually. 
 
  "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I ask for it individually. 
 
  "THE COURT:  I deny it. 
 
  
  "THE CLERK:  Members of the Jury, harken 
onto your verdict as the Court has recorded 
it in the issue joined this indictment, 
Number 94-406 and Carol A. Miller, also known 
as Carol A. Salemo, you find the defendant 
guilty in the manner and form as she stands 
indicted as to Count I, and so say you all? 
 
  "THE JURY:  Yes. 
 
  "THE COURT:  Does any[one] find her not 
guilty as to Count 1? 
 
  (No response). 
 
  "THE CLERK:  As to Count 2, your verdict 
is `guilty' and so say you all? 
 
  "THE JURY:  Yes. 
 
  "THE COURT:  Does anyone say `not 
guilty' as to Count 2? 
 
  (No response) 
 
  "THE COURT:  All right.  Would you take 
the verdict form?"  
 
 
 Defendant contends that the denial of an individual 
poll violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 31 and due process as well.  
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d) does not specify any specific 
form but provides only that before a verdict is recorded, "the 
jury shall be polled at the request of any party or upon the 
court's own motion."   
 In Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194 
(1899), the Supreme Court characterized polling as "an undoubted 
right" and explained that "[i]ts object is to ascertain for a  
certainty that each of the jurors approves of the verdict as 
returned; that no one has been coerced or induced to sign a 
  
verdict to which he does not fully assent."  Judge Maris, writing 
for the Court in Miranda v. United States, 255 F.2d 9, 17 (1st 
Cir. 1958), described the right of the defendant to have the jury 
polled as being "of ancient origin and of basic importance," 
designed "to give each juror an opportunity, before the verdict 
is recorded, to declare in open court his assent to the verdict  
. . . ."   
 Although not of constitutional dimension, the right to 
a poll has its roots in the early common law.  United States v. 
Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 1978).  In 2 Sir Matthew 
Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 299-300 (1st Am. ed. 
1847), the text reads:   
  "Now touching the giving up of their 
verdict, if the jury say they are agreed, the 
court may examine them by poll, and if in 
truth they are not agreed, they are fineable.  
29 Assiz. 27. 40 Assiz. 10.   
 
  "If the jurors by mistake or partiality 
give their verdict in court, yet they may 
rectify their verdict before it is recorded, 
or by advice of the court go together again 
and consider better of it, and alter what 
they have delivered.  Plow. Com. 211. b. 
Saunder's case.   
 
  "But if the verdict be recorded, they 
cannot retract nor alter it."  
 
 An additional advantage to polling is the likelihood 
that it will discourage post-trial efforts to challenge the 
verdict on allegations of coercion on the part of some of the 
jurors.  See Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956, 961 
n.6 (1st Cir. 1986). 
  
 We have acknowledged the importance of the right to 
poll the jury, see Government of Virgin Islands v. Hercules, 875 
F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 1989), United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 
154, 160 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 62 
(1968), but have not prescribed a specific method of doing so.  
In Hercules, we held that a district court erred in refusing to 
take a poll and by relying instead upon the fact that all of the 
jurors had signed the verdict slip as an indication of agreement.  
However, we acknowledged that the prevailing view is that the 
method chosen is within the discretion of the trial judge.  
Hercules, 875 F.2d at 418; United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822, 
832-33 (3d Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Sturman, 49 F.3d 
1275, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995); Audette, 789 F.2d at 959; United 
States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Carter, 772 F.2d 66, 67 (4th Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1982); accord 3 
Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 517, at 33 (2d 
ed. 1982 & Supp. 1995); 8A James W. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice ¶ 31.07, at 31-67 (2d ed. 1995). 
 The general rule of discretion has been applied in a 
variety of circumstances.  It has been cited when the question 
was whether the poll should be taken on each count of an 
indictment or as to each of several defendants; whether polling 
should continue after a juror expressed some misgivings about the 
verdict; and whether re-polling should be allowed.  These 
variations differ, however, from the individual versus collective 
issue.   
  
 A number of courts have concluded that in the 
particular circumstances presented, a collective poll was 
permissible.  United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1139 n.42 
(8th Cir. 1990); Posey v. United States, 416 F.2d 545, 554 (5th 
Cir. 1969);  Turner v. Kelly, 262 F.2d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 1958); 
see Carter, 772 F.2d at 68 (showing of hands).  Nevertheless, the 
preference of the appellate courts, and most district courts, has 
been for an individual jury poll.    
 In Carter, 772 F.2d at 68, the Court "strongly" 
suggested individual polling, stating:  "We find that such a 
procedure best fulfills the purpose of a jury poll."  In Turner, 
262 F.2d at 211, the Court remarked, "[I]ndividual questioning 
would appear to be consonant with the etymological derivation of 
the term, and with the apparent trend of authority."  See also 
Audette, 789 F.2d at 960; Shepherd, 576 F.2d at 722 n.1; United 
States v. Sexton, 456 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1972) ("correct" 
procedure is to poll individual jurors). 
 A respected treatise likewise agrees that individual 
polling is preferable.  In IV Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's 
Criminal Procedure § 586, at 152 (12th ed. 1976), the author 
says:  "There is usually no prescribed mode of polling the jury.  
Any clear and concise form of inquiry is sufficient.  The 
question put to each juror may be simply, `Is this your 
verdict?'"  (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).   
 In Hercules, 875 F.2d at 419 n.8, we noted that the ABA 
Standards Relating to Trial by Jury called for polling each juror 
individually, and we agreed "that this method is the most 
  
desirable."  The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 15-4.5 
provide that the "poll shall be conducted by the court or clerk 
of court asking each juror individually whether the verdict 
announced is his or her verdict."  The commentary to that 
standard reads:  "The jurors are to be questioned individually, 
which is what is generally understood to be contemplated by the 
right to have the jury polled."  Although conceding that, in some 
jurisdictions, a collective inquiry is sufficient, the commentary 
warns that "[t]his procedure is not permitted under the standard, 
for it saves very little time while creating a risk that a juror 
who has been coerced to go along with the majority will not speak 
up."   
 Although our preferred method under Hercules has been 
individual polling, we are bound by our precedent to review the 
procedure followed in the case before us as one that is within 
the discretion of the district court.  As such, we look to the 
record to determine whether the collective method chosen by the 
trial judge here failed to provide a realistic opportunity for a 
potential dissenting juror to reveal his or her opposition before 
the verdict was recorded.   
 In this connection, it is significant that before the 
verdict was announced, the district judge told the jurors that 
they should listen attentively because they would soon be asked 
as a group whether they agreed with the verdict as announced by 
the foreperson.  As noted earlier, after responding collectively 
in the affirmative to the clerk's inquiry, "So say you all?," the 
  
jurors were then asked by the judge, "Does anyone say `not 
guilty.'"  No juror responded to that question.  
 When that proceeding is considered against the backdrop 
of a relatively simple case, a short period of deliberation by 
the jury, and no indication in the record that any of the jurors 
displayed reluctance or disagreement with the verdict, we cannot 
say that the district court abused its discretion.  Accordingly, 
in this instance, we conclude that the collective poll did not 
constitute reversible error. 
 However, we are concerned that in other circumstances 
collective polling may not have the desired effect and may lead 
to unnecessary challenges to the finality of jury verdicts.  
Although we have previously expressed our strong preference for 
individual juror inquiries (the practice that apparently is 
generally followed in the district courts), uniformity has not 
been achieved.  Accordingly, we consider it necessary to adopt a 
supervisory rule for the district courts within this circuit.   
 In the future, whenever a party timely requests that 
the jury be polled, the procedure shall be conducted by inquiry 
of each juror individually, rather than collectively.  
Recognizing that circumstances in each case may vary widely, we 
leave to the discretion of the district courts -- keeping in mind 
the purposes of the polling rule -- whether a separate inquiry 
should be conducted for each count of an indictment or complaint, 
for each of a number of defendants, or for a variety of issues. 
  
 II. 
 Before the trial began, the district court conducted a 
hearing on the government's motion in limine to bar the defendant 
from producing evidence of alleged duress.1  Defendant testified 
to a history of physical and psychological abuse by her husband, 
George Salemo.  In addition, she asserted that he had threatened 
her, her brother, and her mother.  Because Salemo had purported 
ties with organized crime, she believed that he had the ability 
to carry out his threats, even while incarcerated.   
 Defendant testified that she signed the checks and sold 
the car at Salemo's direction, as a result of his threats to 
injure her.  She did not complain to the police, fearing it would 
be ineffectual because of Salemo's work for the Pennsylvania 
Crime Commission.   
 A witness who had previously served with the Crime 
Commission testified that prior to the check-kiting scheme, 
Salemo had been an informant for the Commission and had been 
released from prison in return for his cooperation.  However, the 
arrest in Florida in 1991 was at the instigation of the Crime 
Commission. 
 The district court refused to allow the evidence of 
duress to be introduced.  Ruling from the bench, the district 
                     
1
.  A court may rule pretrial on a motion to preclude a defendant 
from presenting a duress defense where the government contends 
that the evidence in support of that position would be legally 
insufficient.  E.g., United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 
(4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1343 
(2d Cir. 1990). 
  
judge found that because Salemo was in prison in another part of 
the country, there was no immediate threat of death or serious 
injury, no evidence of immediate retaliation tied to the sale of 
the car, nor a lack of reasonable opportunity to escape the 
threatened harm.  Moreover, the court concluded that defendant 
produced no legally significant evidence that she lacked the 
opportunity to contact law enforcement officers.  
 As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. 
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409 (1980), at common law, duress excused 
criminal conduct when the actor was "under an unlawful threat of 
imminent death or serious bodily injury."  The defense is not 
often successful.  "[I]f there was a reasonable, legal 
alternative to violating the law, a chance both to refuse to do 
the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm, the 
defense[] will fail."  Id. at 410 (internal quotation omitted). 
 In United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land 
Located in Warren Township, Bradford County, Pa., 898 F.2d 396, 
399 (3d Cir. 1990), we determined that "[i]n a criminal law 
context, . . . duress contains three elements:  
 (1)  an immediate threat of death or serious 
 bodily injury;  
         
 (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat 
 will be carried out; and,   
 
 (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the 
 threatened harm." 
 
 
See also United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 
1991).  To the same effect, see United States v. Paolello, 951 
  
F.2d 537, 541 (3d Cir. 1991), which added an additional factor -- 
that a defendant should not recklessly place herself in a 
situation in which she would be forced to engage in criminal 
conduct.     
 Our review of the record persuades us that the factors 
of time and distance are fatal to the defendant's claim of 
duress.  Her husband was in jail, many miles removed, when he 
threatened to kill her and her family.  Shortly thereafter, 
defendant talked to an FBI agent and to a representative of the 
Crime Commission, but to neither did she disclose the threats.   
 There was ample opportunity for defendant to 
communicate her claims of duress to law enforcement officials.  
She thus failed in her obligation to notify the authorities 
rather than to violate a criminal law.  The district court did 
not err in barring the defense of duress.   
 III. 
 Defendant further contends that the government acted 
improperly in calling Debra Moser, the defendant's housekeeper, 
to testify.  Defendant argues that because the prosecution had 
impeached that witness in the earlier trial of George Salemo, it 
should not take an inconsistent position at her trial.   
 In 1992, Moser told Thomas Fry, an FBI agent, that she 
knew nothing about how the car was moved from the defendant's 
garage and out of the Allentown area.  However, during Salemo's 
trial in October 1993, Moser, called as a witness by the defense, 
admitted that she had moved the car out of the garage and had 
  
hidden it.  The government then impeached the witness with the 
statement she had given to agent Fry. 
 During the defendant's trial, Moser testified -- this 
time on behalf of the government -- to the same version of events 
that she had given in Salemo's case.  She said that defendant had 
instructed her to move the car from the garage.  Although at odds 
with the statement previously given to the FBI agent, the 
testimony of the witness at both trials was consistent.   
 Relying on Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 
(1956), defendant contends that the government's use of Moser to 
support its case poisoned the trial.  The circumstances presently 
before us, however, are a far cry from Mesarosh where the 
government conceded after the trial in that case that it had 
substantial doubts about the credibility of its principal 
witness, a paid informant.  Here, by contrast, there is no 
allegation that Moser committed perjury.  Her testimony under 
oath at the Salemo trial differed from the unsworn statement that 
she had given to the FBI agent, but it does not follow that the 
government could not believe that her in-court version was the 
truthful one. 
 Moreover, unlike Mesarosh, the government made its FBI 
statement available during the defendant's trial so that she was 
free to use it on cross-examination.  As the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit said in a somewhat similar situation, "Here, 
the poison of perjury by [the witness] . . . was admitted at 
trial and the antidote of cross-examination was available and 
  
used by the defendant."  United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932, 
935 (8th Cir. 1974).   
 In United States v. Hozian, 622 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 
1980), the Court found no impropriety in the government's use of 
a witness whom it had sought to impeach in a previous trial.  The 
Court pointed out that the defendant had ample opportunity to 
develop the matter on cross-examination.  To the same effect, see 
United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Cervantes, 542 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 1976).   
 We are persuaded that the district court did not err in 




 The defendant's final point is that the district court 
erred in refusing to depart downward after being advised of her 
claims of duress, ill health, and diminished capacity.  The 
record demonstrates that the district court was aware of its 
power to depart downward, but in the exercise of discretion,  
  
 
chose not to do so.  In such circumstances, we do not have 
appellate jurisdiction over this issue.  United States v. 
Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1989).  
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
affirmed. 
